ĀTMĀNUŚĀSANA – PRECEPT ON THE SOUL by Ācārya GUṆABHADRA (ca. 818–900 A.D.) [174]
Gātha 173
Any substance – soul or non-soul – exhibits neither absolute permanence (nityatva) nor absolute transience (anityatva). Also, the substance exhibits neither absolute cognition (jñāna, bodha) nor absolute non-existence (abhāva); no substance is actually seen as such. The substance is actually seen with its ever-changing attributes of affirmation (tat, vidhi – existence) as well as of negation (atat, niṣedha – non-existence) or of permanence (nityatva) as well as of transience (anityatva). It is without a beginning and an end. Just as a single substance is permanent (nitya) as well as transient (anitya), one (eka) as well as many (aneka), and distinctive (bheda) as well as non-distinctive (abheda), all substances exhibit these attributes.
[next … gātha 174 → … https://www.om-arham.org/blog/view/588/atmanusasana-%E2%80%93-precept-on-the-soul-by-acarya-gu%E1%B9%87abhadra-ca-818%E2%80%93900-ad-175]
Comments
Note 1:
EXPLANATORY NOTE
Ācārya Samantabhadra’s Āptamīmāṁsā (Devāgamastotra):
If it be accepted that the objects of knowledge have ‘absolute non-existence’ (abhāvaikānata) character and their ‘existence’ (bhāva) character is denied, cognition (bodha) and sentence (vākya) can no longer remain the sources of valid knowledge (pramāṇa). And in the absence of the sources of valid knowledge (pramāṇa), how can the proposed thesis (‘absolute nonexistence’ character of an object of knowledge) be established, and that of the rivals repudiated?
Cf. ‘Saṁvara [part 4178]’ gātha 1-12 https://www.facebook.com/groups/692614454130155/permalink/3459743614083878.